Harry g frankfurt gave what has been taken to be a counter-Example to the principle that, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise." I argue that in his case the agent cannot be morally responsible for what he did, Because it was not within his power not to be compelled to do it. So frankfurt's case is not a counter-Example to this principle.

ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take (...) three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion). It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society. (shrink)

This book is structured in a practical, example-driven, manner. The use of VHDL for constructing logic synthesisers is one of the aims of the book; the second is the application of the tools to the design process. Worked examples, questions and answers are provided together with do and don'ts of good practice. An appendix on logic design the source code are available free of charge over the Internet.

Multiverse theorists provide controversial, unique but unified accounts of divine creation that result in the Anselmian God creating a best world. On what conditions should theists endorse this or any account of divine creation? One available way is to evaluate how well they resolve some intractable problems in philosophical theology. I argue that multiverse accounts do not resolve these problems to a greater degree than some alternative account of divine creation. I conclude that we should endorse the alternative account over (...) multiverse accounts. (shrink)

Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...) to a belief (as opposed to a mere facilitating cause of the belief) is explicated through a series of examples. The account of having a belief that one did something from having done it is then deployed in criticising Ginet's account of ‘memory connection’, in assessing Martin and Deutscher's causal theory of remembering, in indicating how diachronic justification functions in a nontraditional theory of memory, and in setting forth one type of psychological connectedness which, according to advocates of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, may be employed (noncircularly) in formulating the theory, and which, according to opponents of the theory, provides a target for criticising the theory. (shrink)

The social contributors to the formation of expertise are often a taboo subject when practitioner communities interact with outsiders, making the exploration of these inputs a difficult endeavour. When exploring scientific communities, one resource that many STS and HSTM scholars can draw from is their personal experience as students of science – experts in waiting. I will draw on my personal experience as a physics student at a Russel Group university from 2014 to 2018, with a year abroad at a (...) US institution. The UK physics course instilled in me an image of physics expertise that is hyper-specialised, apolitical, and ‘pure’. This was achieved through the choice of curriculum, the content of internal displays, and the culture of the department as mediated by informal interactions. This vision of expertise resonates with corporate entities whose interests are in experts that can function as stable commodities, rather than volatile political actors. (shrink)

The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an (...) adequate definition here must take into account a difference, as to conflicting evidence one does not possess, between evidence one has forgotten and evidence one has never had, (3) that compared to Ginet's traditional definition (1975), the definition has several advantages, and (4) that the definition handles at least one type of situation where there can be memory knowledge that p without previous knowledge that p. (shrink)

Partiendo de la genealogía del neoliberalismo que Michel Foucault traza en _Nacimiento de la biopolítica_ hasta los ordoliberales alemanes, se sostendrá que, si en lugar de haberla basado en sus textos posteriores a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Foucault hubiera acudido a los textos fundacionales de la época de Weimar: a) no hubiera incurrido en el equívoco de pensar que el papel del Estado fue secundario para estos, y b) habría advertido el carácter autoritario de su propuesta. Así, analizaremos en detalle (...) la inverosímil confluencia en torno a una misma tesis de Carl Schmitt y de los ordoliberales en la década de 1930: Estado fuerte, economía sana. Se concluirá invitando a seguir analizando el papel central del Estado y el autoritarismo en el neoliberalismo, tanto en el pasado como en el presente. (shrink)

of (from Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics).

Hans Kelsen, juspositivista austríaco, e Herman Dooyeweerd, jusfilósofo cristão neerlandês, foram pensadores contemporâneos que desenvolveram importantes reflexões sobre a relação entre Estado e direito. -/- Esse livro, além de apresentar e comparar suas perspectivas, analisa os comprometimentos teóricos e os problemas políticos e jurídicos do pensamento de Hans Kelsen a partir da filosofia de Herman Dooyeweerd. -/- A obra pode contribuir para as discussões contemporâneas acerca da relação entre Estado e direito e suas consequências para a teorização sobre política e (...) justiça em uma sociedade plural. (shrink)

A filosofia político-social de Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977) ainda é pouco conhecida no Brasil. Esse livro, resultado de minhas pesquisas no Mestrado de Filosofia da Universidade Federal da Paraíba, apresenta e discute a perspectiva teórica dooyeweerdiana sobre a ordem de uma sociedade complexa. A filosofia de Herman Dooyeweerd pode contribuir para a reflexão e ação cristã em uma sociedade moderna e plural. Em Dooyeweerd, é possível encontrar uma teoria política e social abrangente para pensar e atuar no ambiente público, rejeitando orientações (...) ideológicas secularistas. Herman Dooyeweerd pode nos ajudar a refletir sobre política e sociedade na medida em que nos faz reconhecer princípios estruturais na realidade criada por Deus que estruturam cada esfera e relação social em seu âmbito de soberania. Em contraponto ao positivismo e ao historicismo, Dooyeweerd nos indica caminhos para compreender as normas divinas para cada centímetro quadrado da existência. Além de denunciar o comprometimento religioso do imanentismo das ideologias políticas, Dooyeweerd tem muito a dizer sobre como pensar política e sociedade na ordem da história. (shrink)

It has been argued that neural data are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states, and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ. Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies, it (...) is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture. (shrink)

This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.

The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies (...) law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her. (shrink)

Summary One aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of the recent attempts to interpret the development of Galileo's theory of motion in the late Paduan period 1604?1610. In addition to this a new interpretation of this process of development is advanced. This interpretation is the first that proves able to provide a full account of all the features on folio 152r of volume 72 of the Galilean manuscripts which has been claimed to be of crucial significance. The (...) major feature of the interpretation is that it is the first to account for the relationship between Galileo's theoretical and experimental work in the period 1604?1610. (shrink)

Against Russell’s skeptical conjecture, that the world and its entire population came into existence five minutes ago, it is argued that any one of the following is logically incompatible with the conjunction of the other two: ostensible memories of certain events, records of such events, and the non-occurrence of these same events. This conclusion is reached through a critical examination of (1) the arguments advanced by Norman Malcolm in trying to show that Russell’s “hypothesis” does not express a logical possibility, (...) and (2) the counterarguments by which James W. Cornman tries to show that it does. (shrink)

In a paper "The intentionality of memory," Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.

Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) (...) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading. (shrink)

One difference between traditional and contemporary nontraditional theories of memory is that the former would affirm, whereas the latter would deny, that a person can be correctly described as having remembered that p solely in virtue of having knowledge the certainty of which is grounded upon the person’s present remembering. I argue that there cannot be such a case, and that what may appear to be such a case—as presented in Don Locke’s book Memory—can be explicated by a contemporary nontraditional (...) theorist without making any concessions to the traditional theorist. (shrink)

The current human rights framework can shield people from many of the risks associated with neurotechnological applications. However, it has been argued that we need either to articulate new rights or reconceptualise existing ones in order to prevent some of these risks. In this paper, we would like to address the recent discussion about whether current reconceptualisations of the right to mental integrity identify an ethical dimension that is not covered by existing moral and/or legal rights. The main challenge of (...) these proposals is that they make mental integrity indistinguishable from autonomy. They define mental integrity in terms of the control we can have over our mental states, which seems to be part of the authenticity condition for autonomous action. Based on a fairly comprehensive notion of mental health (ie, a notion that is not limited to the mere absence of illness), we propose an alternative view according to which mental integrity can be characterised both as a positive right to (medical and non-medical) interventions that restore and sustain mental and neural function, and promote its development and a negative right protecting people from interventions that threaten or undermine these functions or their development. We will argue that this notion is dissociated from cognitive control and therefore can be adequately distinguished from autonomy. (shrink)

Esse livro é uma introdução ao pensamento de Abraham Kuyper. O texto se destina àqueles que desejam começar a compreender o pensamento de Kuyper. A primeira parte do livro se dedica à vida e obra de Kuyper, como também à sua articulação do calvinismo como um sistema de vida e pensamento todo abrangente. Na segunda unidade, apresenta-se a relação feita por Kuyper entre calvinismo, ciência e filosofia política. Por fim, na última unidade, expõe-se a articulação entre calvinismo, cultura e artes. (...) Kuyper continua a ser um personagem muito importante para o cristianismo contemporâneo. Ele desenvolveu uma teologia pública abrangente capaz de orientar os cristãos para um engajamento cultural a partir de um arcabouço bíblico. (shrink)

The two leading theoretical approaches to tort law — economic analysis and corrective justice — are blind to distributive considerations. Moreover, even the main distributive approaches to tort law — loss-spreading and fairness — fail to emphasize egalitarianism as a distributive consideration. This article argues that egalitarianism should influence the normative evaluation of one’s conduct as negligent or not. It first explains why normatively negligence law should be sensitive to the egalitarian concern, suggesting three different accounts for this claim, based (...) on needs, equality, and desert as criteria for distribution. Second, it argues that egalitarianism is commensurate with the basic understanding of negligence law as reflecting corrective justice and notions of fault. The notion of fault is, therefore, reformulated from within, in order to accommodate egalitarianism. Third, I maintain that in order for egalitarianism to accommodate notions of corrective justice, egalitarian concerns should matter also at the stage of the standard of care. While the egalitarian concern can and should be integrated into the duty stage, I argue that such integration is insufficient. A correct and full understanding of the egalitarian concern and the tort of negligence requires a conclusion that the normative evaluation of one’s action as negligent or not cannot be separated from the distributive results that this action entails. The egalitarian concern works at the duty stage as an excuse for not imposing liability for wrongful activity. In contrast, at the standard stage, it works as a justification that turns an otherwise wrongful activity into a legitimate one. My claim is that morally we should usually expect more care from the better-off than from the disadvantaged. Findings of negligence are based on the failure to balance properly between one’s interests and those of another. In deciding to what extent the defendant should burden herself in order to prevent a loss to potential victims, one morally relevant criterion is the relative ability of the injurer and victim to bear precaution costs and expected accident loss, respectively. (shrink)

Author: Paź Bogusław Title: ONTOLOGY VERSUS METAPHYSICS. GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE MODERN THEORY OF BEING (Ontologia versus metafizyka? Geneza, rozwój i różne postaci nowożytnej teorii bytu) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 817-847 Keywords: ONTOLOGY, MODERN METAPHYSICS, ESSENCE, ESSENTIALISM, IDEA, REPRESENTATIONISM, RATIONALISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper presents the process of modern metaphysics transforming into the ontology. The major points of this process became: (...) 1) scholastic sources of Catholic metaphysics represented by Fonseca, Suarez, Śmiglecki on the one side and Protestant metaphysics, represented by Goclenius and Clauberg, on the other; 2) Descartes’ epistemology of representation and 3) Leibniz’s rational and pluralistic metaphysics (monadology). The climax of the transformation process appears to be “Philosophia prima sive ontologia” (1729), a masterpiece being written by Wolff, where the first system of the ontology (science about being as possibility) was presented as a discipline independent from the traditional metaphysics. However starting with the Kant’s works ontology no longer was the discipline of knowledge about the real world but has being turned into a field of aprioristic categories of thinking about an existence and the physical world. (shrink)

This volume presents a selection of papers from the Poincaré Project of the Center for the Philosophy of Science, University of Lisbon, bringing together an international group of scholars with new assessments of Henri Poincaré's philosophy of science-both its historical impact on the foundations of science and mathematics, and its relevance to contemporary philosophical inquiry. The work of Poincaré (1854-1912) extends over many fields within mathematics and mathematical physics. But his scientific work was inseparable from his groundbreaking philosophical reflections, and (...) the scientific ferment in which he participated was inseparable from the philosophical controversies in which he played a pre-eminent part. The subsequent history of the mathematical sciences was profoundly influenced by Poincaré's philosophical analyses of the relations between and among mathematics, logic, and physics, and, more generally, the relations between formal structures and the world of experience. The papers in this collection illuminate Poincaré's place within his own historical context as well as the implications of his work for ours. (shrink)

Professor Tucker in the C.R. vol. xi. pp. 341 sqq. has revolutionized our notions of ‘doubtful syllables’: we have now learned that such syllables are normally short, and that lengthening is the licence.